The Industrial Court has dismissed an application by suspended United Holdings Group Chief Executive Officer Nelsiwe De Sousa to stop disciplinary proceedings against her.
The court ruled that she had no reasonable prospects of success on appeal.
In a judgement, issued by Industrial Court Judge Manene Thwala, the court criticised the growing trend of litigants seeking stay of execution orders after losing cases, saying such applications often frustrate successful parties from enjoying the benefits of court judgements.
“This is one of the many applications that are now besieging this Court wherein a litigant having had a definite judgement entered against them yet still insist on stultifying the successful party from enjoying the proceeds of its judgement through the lodgement of an application for a stay of execution,” Judge Thwala said.
De Sousa had approached the court seeking a stay of execution of a judgement delivered on April 16, 2026, pending an appeal she had noted a day later.
The matter stems from an employment dispute between De Sousa and United Holdings Ltd, cited as the first respondent, alongside Philip De Sousa as second respondent and the company’s Board of Directors as third respondent.
According to court records, United Holdings sought to terminate De Sousa’s employment as Group CEO through a letter dated November 28, 2025.
In response, De Sousa filed an urgent court application challenging the dismissal and seeking an order declaring it invalid.
The parties later reached what the court described as an amicable settlement, resulting in a consent order issued on January 30, 2026. The order allowed De Sousa to continue working in her position as Group CEO.
However, less than a month later, on February 18, 2026, the company suspended her pending disciplinary proceedings. The disciplinary hearing was subsequently scheduled for March 5, 2026.
De Sousa again rushed to court on an urgent basis, this time seeking to challenge the company’s authority to suspend her and institute disciplinary proceedings against her.
The Industrial Court dismissed that application on April 16, finding that nothing in the January 30 consent order prevented the company from taking disciplinary action against her.
Unhappy with the outcome, De Sousa filed an appeal and sought a stay of execution pending the determination of the appeal.
Part of her appeal centred on allegations that the court committed a legal error by failing to afford the parties a hearing after attempts at amicable settlement had failed.
Judge Thwala, however, dismissed this argument, describing it as lacking merit and having no reasonable prospects of success on appeal.
The judge noted that the court had merely encouraged the parties to explore settlement options and that such a directive did not amount to a final or appealable order.
Citing South African authorities, including the case of Zweni v Minister of Law and Order, the court stated that non-final rulings which do not determine the rights of parties are generally not appealable.
“It is an uncontestable fact that the decision of this Court inviting the parties to engage each other with a view of arriving at an out-of-court settlement had nothing to do with the three-pronged test for the appealability of an interlocutory order,” the judgement stated.
Judge Thwala further held that the January 30 consent order was effectively a contract voluntarily entered into by the parties and not a judicial determination on the merits of the dispute.
The court emphasised that parties who freely consent to court orders cannot later seek to challenge them through appeals in the manner adopted by De Sousa.
During arguments in the main hearing, the judge said the court had already cautioned De Sousa’s legal representatives against attempting to expand the wording of the consent order to accommodate what the court termed “subjective intentions”.
The judgement relied on Zimbabwean and South African case law dealing with consent orders, including Technoimpex JSC v Rajendrakumar Jog and 4 Others and Thambi v Stalka N.O and Another.
Quoting from one of the authorities, the court noted: “It is impossible to imagine any circumstances in which a party could appeal against a judgement by consent.”
Judge Thwala said any party aggrieved by a consent order must instead apply for it to be set aside on recognised legal grounds applicable to contracts under common law, rather than attributing error to the court itself.
The court ultimately concluded that there were no reasonable prospects that the consent judgement issued by Judge V.Z. Dlamini on January 30, 2026 could successfully be challenged through the appeal process pursued by De Sousa.
“A party who freely and voluntarily agrees to a consent order cannot turn-around and attribute such an order as a subsequent legal error by the court,” Judge Thwala ruled.
The application for a stay of execution was accordingly dismissed.
No order as to costs was made
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